I correct two misapprehensions, one historical and one conceptual, in the recent literature on extensions of the Wigner's Friend thought-experiment. Perhaps fittingly, both concern the accurate description of some quantum physicists' beliefs by others.
If an agent A is certain that a system is in an eigenstate of an observable X with eigenvalue ξ and time t 0 , and a measurement of X is completed at time t > t 0 , then A is certain that the result x of the measurement is x = ξ at time t.
Sudbery asserts that QBism accepts this assumption (see his Table 1 ). This is incorrect; in fact, QBism finds it ill-posed in multiple ways. First, a QBist would never say that a system is "in" a quantum state, eigen-or otherwise. Any quantum state is an agent's encoding of their own expectations regarding a physical system. The system is not in a quantum state any more than the Earth's atmosphere is in a weather forecast. Therefore, a good QBist agent would not be "certain that a system is in an eigenstate" of X; the agent's choice of a pure-state ascription is itself the expression of their certainty. This point also affects the evaluation of how QBism responds to other statements, such as Sudbery's Assumption (P).
Second, and more subtly, Assumption (Q) conflates statements applying to different times. Let us say that at time t 0 , Alice ascribes the quantum state |ψ to a physical system of interest. If Alice lives up to the consistency standard known as quantum theory, then she must consequently be maximally confident regarding the outcome of a specific later measurement. At time t 0 , she fully expects that the von Neumann measurement X completed at time t > t 0 will have outcome ξ. This is a statement about her gambling commitments at time t 0 , not what she might believe when time t finally arrives. There is a crucial difference between "Alice is certain at time t that X will yield ξ" and "Alice is certain at time t 0 that she will be certain at a later time t that X will yield ξ". For additional discussion deliniating the qualitatively different things too often clumped together as "time evolution", see [14] [15] [16] .
Here is Frauchiger and Renner's version of Assumption (Q):
Suppose that agent A has established that Assumption (Q) corresponds to the quantum-mechanical Born rule. Since the assumption is concerned with the special case of probability-1 predictions only, it is largely independent of interpretational questions, such as the meaning of probabilities in general.
QBism maintains that predictions made with p = 1 are still probabilistic predictions, just as those with p = 0.99, or p = 0.999. This is an essential ingredient in the QBist take on the EPR "paradox" and Bell inequalities [11, 12] . Statement A (iii) in Assumption (Q) appears to play the role of the EPR criterion of reality, namely attempting to infer pre-existing physical reality from p = 1 predictions, a move that QBism finds inadmissable. Whether or not one accepts this position, the fact is that it exists in the spectrum of foundational debate, and taking it on board affects the validity of conclusions one might attempt to draw. Thus, restricting one's argument to probability-1 predictions does not make one's desired conclusion "largely independent" of the interpretation of probability. The question of how to interpret probability theory is too fundamental to be sidestepped in this manner. Trying to do so is like saying, "We discuss only the colors black and white, so our logic is independent of questions about visual perception."
Consequently, the row about QBism in Frauchiger and Renner's Table 4 is in error. Further examination and exegesis are possible [16] . For example, the question of interpreting probability-1 statements is a good jumping-off point to understand the divergence between the Caves-Fuchs-Schack collaborations and QBism proper [17] . However, this comment is already long enough.
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